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Abstract 
Well-functioning financial markets and banking institutions are usually considered to be a 
condition favourable to economic growth. The importance of bank efficiency and bank market 
concentration has also been the object of discussion, with the general belief that while they are of 
particular relevance in the context of the European Union, there is no consensus on their specific 
roles.  
This paper aims to study the effects on economic growth of the efficiency of the banking 
institutions, measured through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and also of the concentration 
of the bank markets, measured by the percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest 
banking institutions (C3) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Considering a panel of all 
27 EU countries for the time period between 1996 and 2008, the study analyses the influence of 
these bank and market conditions not only on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also on its 
components: the final consumption expenditure, the gross fixed capital formation, the export of 
goods and services and the import of goods and services. 
The main findings point to the generally positive influence of bank cost efficiency on economic 
growth. More precisely, this influence is statistically significant for GDP and particularly with 
respect to the gross fixed capital formation. With regard to the bank market concentration, a 
generally negative influence is revealed, not only on GDP, but also on its components and is 
statistically more significant for the gross fixed capital formation, as well as for the export and 
import of goods and services.  
 
Keywords: Bank efficiency, market concentration, economic growth, European Union.  
 JEL Classification: G21; F43; D4; L11 
 
                                                     
[1] ISEG-UTL – School of Economics and Management of the Technical University of Lisbon  
 and UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and Economics 
Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 - LISBON, PORTUGAL 
tel: +351 21 392 58 00 





Bank efficiency, market concentration and economic growth in the European 
Union 
 
1. Introduction  
Recently, the extent to which well-developed and accessible credit markets and institutions may 
be an important condition to economic growth has become clearer. Banks and other financial 
institutions are supposed to guarantee the financing of productive investments and activities, as 
they mobilise and allocate financial resources and also by means of their specific money-creation 
processes through bank credit. At the same time, well-functioning markets and financial 
institutions may decrease the transaction costs and asymmetric information problems. In 
addition, they are supposed to play an important role in identifying investment opportunities, 
selecting the most profitable projects, mobilising savings, facilitating trading and the 
diversification of risk, as well as improving corporate governance mechanisms. 
There is a large strand of literature that analyses theoretically and empirically the link between 
economic growth and the development of the financial systems (represented among many others, 
by such authors as King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Guiso et. al. (2004) and 
Hassan et al. (2011). On the other hand, the study of the importance of bank efficiency and bank 
market concentration has also been the object of discussion and it is generally accepted that they 
are of particular relevance in the context of the European Union, although their roles still  remain 
controversial (see Goddard et al., 2007; Molyneux, 2009; among others).  
 
This paper is a contribution to the study of the link between financial intermediation and 
economic growth in the context of the European Union. We take into account that in our society, 
economic growth depends on capital accumulation and most particularly, on bank credit 
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financing; furthermore, we have in mind the mechanisms through which savings are channelled 
to productive investments that contribute to economic growth. These mechanisms involve both 
financial intermediaries (mostly banking institutions, for indirect financing) and financial 
markets (for the direct financing). Thus, we analyse the importance to economic growth of the 
performance of the banking institutions (particularly of bank efficiency) and of market 
conditions (more precisely, of the market concentration).  
In this context, our study contributes to the literature mostly in the following ways.  
First, like Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), we test the importance to economic growth of the 
concentration of bank markets, here measured by the percentage share of the total assets held by 
the three largest banking institutions (C3) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). However, 
in contrast to these authors (and among others, Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Claessens and Laeven, 
2005; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2009), we do not consider the influence of the 
external financial dependence, but instead we analyse the effect of the efficiency of the banking 
institutions, measured through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).   
Second, we analyse the influence of these bank and market conditions not only on the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), but also on its components: final consumption expenditure, gross fixed 
capital formation, the export of goods and services and the import of goods and services. 
Third, we consider a panel of all 27 EU member states for a relatively long time period:  between 
1996 and 2008. By the middle of the 1990s, Europe was preparing for the implementation of the 
single currency and many of the actual member states were adapting to new market conditions, 
whereas 2008 may be considered to mark the onset of the current financial crisis. We will not 
analyse the consequences of this crisis, but rather the situation during the 12 years preceding it, 
and in all 27 current members of the European Union. 
Our main findings point to the general positive influence of the bank cost efficiency on economic 
growth. More precisely, this influence is statistically significant for GDP, above all for the gross 
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fixed capital formation. In relation to the bank market concentration, our results are in line with 
those obtained by, for instance, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), as concentration has a general 
negative influence not only on GDP, but also on its components and is statistically more 
significant for the gross fixed capital formation and also for the export and import of goods and 
services.  
   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review; 
Section 3 explains the methodological framework and the data used; Section 4 reports the main 




2. Brief literature review  
During recent decades, and particularly since the renowned King and Levine (1993) paper, there 
has been an increase of empirical studies at the aggregate level which explain output variables 
with financial ratios and variables such as liquid liabilities, bank loans to the private sector, or 
stock market capitalisation, which may be representative of the development of the financial 
systems and institutions.    
In one such study, Levine and Zervos (1998), using data for 49 countries for the period 1976-
1990, conclude that there is a strong correlation between the rates of real per-capita output 
growth and stock market liquidity.   
Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (1999), with data for 150 countries during the 1990s, conclude that 
the wealthy countries have more developed financial systems, characterising this development 
by the size and efficiency of the financial sector, measured by the assets, liabilities, overhead 
costs and interest margins.  
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A few years later, Beck et al. (2004) used the ratio of the value of credit from financial 
intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP as a proxy to capture the depth and breadth 
of the financial intermediation in a panel of 52 countries over the period 1960 to 1999. They 
conclude that financial development is not only clearly pro-growth but also pro-poor, that is, in 
countries with better-developed financial intermediation, income inequality declines more 
rapidly. 
Analysing these studies, we agree with  Khan and Senhadji (2000), who, in providing a review of 
the literature and empirical evidence of the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, concluded that the results of these studies indicate that while the general 
effects of financial development on the outputs are positive, the size of these effects varies with 
the different variables considered, with the indicators of financial development and with the 
estimation method, data frequency or the defined functional form of the relationship. 
Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argued that there is no clear causality between financial 
development and economic growth and proposed further tests to analyse the mechanism through 
which financial development may promote economic growth taking into account both country 
and sectoral effects. Rather than adhering to the traditional explanation of economic growth by 
proxies of the financial development, Rajan and Zingales (1998) test the hypothesis that financial 
markets and banking  institutions  not only reduce the cost of financing, but also help to combat 
the problems provoked by asymmetrical information, assuming in their test  that the sectors most 
dependent on external financing will be the ones that grow faster and in line with the 
development of  the financial markets and institutions to which these sectors  have access. 
  
At the same time, and particularly with the global trend of bank consolidation, there has been an 
increase of theoretical debates and empirical analysis of the relationship between bank market 
concentration and bank performance.  
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Until the 1990s, there was a general belief that mergers did not clearly contribute to bank 
performance improvements and several empirical findings were consistent with the traditional 
structure conduct performance statements, in particular with the “quiet life hypothesis” (e.g. 
Berger and Hannan, 1989, 1998; Hannan and Berger, 1991; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Pilloff, 
1996). 
From the year 2000, this general consensus was broken when particular attention was paid to 
such specific characteristics of the banking markets as the presence of asymmetric information, 
contagion phenomena and imperfect competition, or the specific impacts of bank concentration, 
competition and regulation on bank performance (among others, De Brand and Davis, 2000;  
Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Berger et al., 2004;  Hasan et al., 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009).  
With regard to the empirical tests of the relationship between the bank market structure 
(represented by the market share or concentration indices) and bank efficiency (measured either 
by parametric methods, like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis, or by non-parametric methods, like 
the Data Envelopment Analysis), several papers tend to support the efficient structure 
hypothesis, underlining the importance of the relationship between bank cost efficiency and bank 
concentration or market share (for instance, Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Punt and Van Rooij, 2003; 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). 
 
However, it is generally recognised that not many works have addressed the possible relationship 
between banking market structure, bank performance (particularly bank efficiency) and 
economic growth.  
In one of these studies, Carbó Valverde et al. (2003) analyse the relationship between financial 
market competition and economic growth in five large regions in Spain and, using Granger 
causality tests, conclude that the differences in competition are not associated with improved 
regional growth.  
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Comparing the financial systems of different countries and regions, Allen and Gale (2001) 
conclude that there is inherent inefficiency within the monopolistic power of banks, which may 
also adopt an excessively conservative approach while the competitive nature of markets tends to 
encourage innovation and growth-enhancing activities. 
At the same time, and following Rajan and Zangales’ (1998) contribution, there is a stand of 
empirical studies that use industry-level and firm-level data to analyse the channels through 
which financial development contributes to economic growth.  
In one such study, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) develop the Rajan and Zangales (1998) model 
and, considering a sample of 41 countries and 36 economic sectors, for the time period 1980-
1990, conclude that there is empirical evidence of a general depressing effect on growth 
associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors and all firms 
indiscriminately. 
More recently, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2009) used different measures of bank 
market competition for a sample of 21 countries and 53 economic sectors during the time period 
1993-2003, concluding not only that there is a positive effect of financial development on the 
economic growth of the sectors most dependent on external finance, but also that the exercise of 
bank market power promotes economic growth. 
Different conclusions are obtained by Claessens and Laeven (2005) using industry-specific and 
country-specific data for 16 countries (mostly for the time period 1980-90, but also for the period 
1980-97) to estimate a measure of banking competition based on industrial organisation theory 
and then relating this competition measure to the growth of the industries. Their findings point to 
the evidence that greater competition in the countries’ banking systems will contribute to the 
faster growth of the financially-dependent industries and so there is no support for the hypothesis 
that market power is good for access to financing and promoting economic growth. 
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At the same time, and specifically with regard to the measurement of the quality of the financial 
development and its possible influence on economic growth, Hasan et al. (2009) use a sample of 
147 regions in 11 European countries, between 1996 ad 2004, finding that regional economic 




3. Methodological framework and data used 
We will take into account the model specification of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and the 
contributions of Claessens and Laeven (2004, 2005) to analyse the influence of market structure 
and banking competition on economic growth and the more recent contribution of Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara (2009), who used market concentration measures and banking 
competition measures to explain the growth of 53 economic sectors in 21 countries.  
We will not consider the growth of economic sectors here, but rather we will test the influence of 
bank efficiency and bank market concentration on GDP growth and on its components: final 
consumption, investment, exports and imports.  
 
The basic model to be estimated will be: 
Growth i,t = α0 + α1 year dummiesi + α2  country dummiest + α3 lag1 growth i,t-1 + α4 bank 




 Growth = natural logarithm of the GDP (at market prices), or of one of its 
components: final consumption, gross fixed capital formation, exports or imports; 
 i = EU country (1 = 1, ... 27); 
 t = year (t = 1996, ..., 2008); 
 lag1 growth = first lag (t-1) of the growth endogenous variable;  
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 bank efficiency = natural logarithm of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
bank cost efficiency; 
 bank market concentration = natural logarithm of the percentage share of the 
total assets held by the three largest banking institutions (C3)  or natural logarithm of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI); 
 control variables = return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE). 
 
The inclusion of the year and country dummies aims to capture the influence of the considered 
specific time period (between 1996 and 2008) and also the influence of the country-specific 
factors that affect the economic growth of the 27 EU member states. 
 
In the next pages, before presenting the results of the estimated model, we need to present the 
explanatory variables of our model and particularly to specify how we measure bank efficiency 
and bank market concentration.  
 
 
3.1. Bank  efficiency 
The research into efficiency is usually based on the estimation of efficiency frontiers with the 
best combinations of the different inputs and outputs of the production process and then on the 
analysis of the deviations from the frontier that correspond to the losses of efficiency. 
Most of the empirical studies on the measurement of bank efficiency adopt either parametric 
methods, like the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), or non-parametric methods, in particular 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
Here, we will adopt the DEA methodology (developed by, among others, Coelli et al., 1998; 
Thanassoulis et al., 2007) and we will follow the intermediation approach, considering that the 
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banks’ total costs will depend on three bank outputs: total loans, total securities and other 
earning assets; and also on three bank inputs: borrowed funds, physical capital and labour (see 
Appendix A for a presentation of the DEA methodology and the chosen bank outputs and 
inputs). 
Our data are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD. The sample comprises annual data 
from consolidated accounts of the commercial and saving banks of all 27 EU countries between 
1996 and 2008. Appendix B presents the annual number of banks for each country that are 
available in the BankScope CD and included in our sample. 
Using the available data, the DEA frontier will be defined by the piecewise linear segments that 
represent the combinations of the best-practice observations, the measurement of efficiency 
being relative to the particular frontier obtained. If the actual production of one decision-making 
unit (DMU) lies on the frontier, this production unit will be considered perfectly efficient, 
whereas if it is situated below the frontier, the DMU will be inefficient; the distance of the actual 
to the potential level of production will define the level of efficiency of any individual DMU.  
Thus, with the DEA approach, the efficiency score for any DMU is not defined absolutely in 
comparison with a universal efficiency standard; rather, it is always defined as the distance to the 
particular production frontier, that is, in relation to the other DMUs that are included in the 
specific data set. As a consequence, DEA provides efficiency scores even in the presence of 
relatively few observations, which represents a great advantage in comparison with the 
parametric approaches (like the SFA), as the latter require the availability of sufficient 
observations to allow the estimation of specific production functions. 
Appendix C reports the obtained DEA yearly bank cost efficiency results of the EU countries for 
the time period between 1996 and 2008.  
In spite of the year-on-year oscillations, there is a clear trend in many EU countries to the 
decrease of bank cost efficiency (particularly for some large countries like Germany and France, 
11 
 
and other, smaller countries including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
the Netherlands). On the other hand, for some of the new EU member states, there is a trend to 
the increase of bank cost efficiency (particularly evident for Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
 
3.2. Bank market concentration   
Among the possible concepts and measures of market concentration, we opt to use two of the 
most popular indicators: the percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest banking 
institutions (C3) of each EU member-state and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which, 
also in terms of each member-state’s total bank assets, is calculated as the sum of the squares of 
the market shares of each of the country’s banking institutions.  
For the interpretation of the HHI, we follow the general rule that considers the presence of low 
concentration if HHI <1000; if HHI > 1800, there is high concentration; and if 1000 < HHI < 
1800, the market will be moderately concentrated. 
To obtain the concentration measures C3 and HHI, we continue to use data sourced from the 
IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD: annual data from the consolidated accounts of the commercial and 
savings banks of all EU countries between 1996 and 2008. 
The C3 and HHI results are presented in Appendix D and clearly show that, with some 
exceptions, there is a general increase in the bank market concentration. The exceptions are to be 
found in the Netherlands and Greece and most particularly in certain new EU member states, like 
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, and also in the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta 
and Slovakia, although less strongly. 
On the other hand, and in spite of the general increase in EU bank market concentration between 
1996 and 2008, the levels of concentration continue to be relatively low in the five most 
important EU countries: France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy (the latter only 
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up to 2005), countries that clearly account for the majority of the banks included in our panel 
(see Appendix B).  
 
 
3.3. Control variables 
In our estimations, we will also consider the influence on economic growth (and on its main 
components) of two variables that are commonly used to analyse the performance of the banking 
sector: the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE).  
The ROA is the ratio of the net income to the total assets of the banks and is useful in the 
assessment of the use of the banks’ resources and their financial strength. However, for the 
banking industry, most analysts prefer to use the ROE, that is, the ratio of the net income to the 
banks’ equity, to judge the performance not only of an individual bank, but also of the entire 
bank sector. 
The bank net income gives, by itself, a good idea of the bank’s performance, but it suffers from 
an important drawback: it does not take into account the bank’s size and it makes difficult the 
comparisons among different banking institutions and/or during different time periods.  
However, the use of the above-mentioned ratios corrects for the size of the banks and makes 
possible the comparisons among institutions for the same or for different time periods.   
Thus, the ROA is a simple measure of bank profitability that gives a good idea of how well the 
bank administration is doing its job, that is, how well the bank’s assets are being used to generate 
profits. This is a clear bank performance measure, but not the most relevant for the bank’s 
shareholders. The bank’s shareholders are particularly interested in the relationship between the 
bank’s earning and their equity investment, which can be measured by the ROE.  
Appendix E presents the ROA and ROE obtained for our sample of banking institutions of all 
EU countries between 1996 and 2008.  
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Both ratios reveal the clear difficulties of the banking institutions of some important EU 
countries in 2008. With regard to the ROA, for the years before 2008, there are few negative 
results and only for some new EU member states and some critical years of Germany’s 
reunification process. Nevertheless, generally speaking, during the time period between 1996 
and 2007, the ROA results obtained reveal a general tendency to the increase of the profits 
generated from the banks’ assets in most of the EU countries. 
The ROE results confirm the negative situations in 2008 and the few negative values for the 
banking institutions of some new EU members and of the reunited Germany. However, for the 
years before 2008 there is no clear trend to the increase or decrease of the ROE results.  On the 
contrary, the ROE results reveal clear oscillations in the ratio of the banks’ earnings and the 
equity investment of their shareholders in all EU countries.  
 
 
3.4. Sources of data and series used 
As was mentioned before, our sample includes yearly data from all 27 EU countries, for the time 
period between 1996 and 2008. All financial and bank performance variables are sourced from 
the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD (annual data from the consolidated accounts of the commercial 
and saving banks, all in nominal values and in euros).  
The macroeconomic data are sourced from the Eurostat statistical database and include: the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the final consumption expenditure, the gross fixed capital 
formation, the exports of goods and services and also the imports of goods and services. All 
these series are at market prices (as are also the financial variables), in millions of ECUs up to 
31.12.1998 and millions of euros from 1.1.1999. 
Before proceeding with the estimations of the presented equation, we test the stationarity of the 
series, using the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) panel unit root test, which may be viewed as a 
14 
 
pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or as an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, when lags are included and the 
null hypothesis is the existence of non-stationarity. This test is adequate for heterogeneous 
panels of moderate size, like the panels used in this paper, and it assumes that there is a common 
unit root process. The main results obtained are reported in Appendix F and clearly allow us to 
reject the existence of the null hypothesis, although for the macroeconomic variables, only of 
their first differences (and since these variables are expressed in logarithms, their differences can 
then be interpreted as growth rates).  
Appendix G presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the series of data used 




4. Empirical results  
The results of the estimation of equation (1) with robust OLS regressions are presented in 
Appendix H, where the different tables (from Table H1 to Table H5) report the results for the 
GDP and for its components. In all situations, four models are estimated, all including the first 
lag of the correspondent dependent variable, the year and the country dummies (whose specific 
results are not reported, but are available on request) and the constant; the four models differ by 
the combinations of the two measures of bank market concentration (HHI or C3) and the two 
control variables (ROA or ROE). 
In relation to the GDP (Table H1), the obtained F statistics and the relatively high values of the 
R-squares for panel estimates, in general, allow us to accept the validity of the estimation results.  
The results obtained for equation 1, concerning GDP, are also summarised in Table 1 below. 
In the four models, the growth (natural logarithm) of the DEA bank cost efficiency is statistically 
significant and contributes positively to the increase of the variation (first difference) of the GDP 
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growth (natural logarithm). The same applies to the ROA and ROE ratios and they clearly 
contribute to the positive variation of the GDP growth. These results are in line with the 
empirical studies that conclude that financial development, or the good performance of the 
banking sector, facilitates economic growth (for example King and Levine, 1993; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Hassan et al., 2011). 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the results obtained for GDP 
Explanatory variables (model 1) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 2) Effect 
Lag1 GDP - *   Lag1 GDP - * 
DEA bank cost efficiency + **  DEA bank cost efficiency + ** 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio + *  Return on assets (ROA) ratio + * 
Constant + *  Constant + * 
     
Explanatory variables (model 3) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 4) Effect 
Lag1 GDP - **  Lag1 GDP - ** 
DEA bank cost efficiency + *  DEA bank cost efficiency + * 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio + ***  Return on equity (ROE) ratio + *** 
Constant + *  Constant + * 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** 
statistically significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Estimation results of equation 1 reported in Table H1 of Appendix H. 
 
Regarding the bank market concentration measures (the growth of the HHI and C3, measured by 
the respective natural logarithms), the results obtained, although statistically less strong, reveal 
their negative influence on the differences of the GDP growth. A similar conclusion was 
previously obtained by Centorelli and Gamberra (2001) who, using information on 41 countries 
and 36 manufacturing sectors in the 1980s, found a negative general effect of market 
concentration on economic growth for all sectors and firms.  
 
The results obtained for the final consumption expenditure are reported in Table H2 of  
Appendix H and also summarised in Table 2 below. Although statistically less relevant, these 
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results are completely in line with those obtained for GDP, revealing that the variation of the 
growth of the final consumption expenditure represents an important part of the aggregate GDP, 
whereas consumption has its own specific dynamics and is less dependent on the evolution of the 
explanatory financial variables than GDP.  
 
Table 2 – Summary of the results obtained for final consumption expenditure 
Explanatory variables (model 1) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 2) Effect 
Lag1 Final consumption -    Lag1 Final consumption -  
DEA bank cost efficiency +   DEA bank cost efficiency +  
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio +   Return on assets (ROA) ratio +  
Constant +   Constant +  
     
Explanatory variables (model 3) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 4) Effect 
Lag1 Final consumption -   Lag1 Final consumption -  
DEA bank cost efficiency +   DEA bank cost efficiency +  
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio +   Return on equity (ROE) ratio +  
Constant +   Constant +  
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** 
statistically significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Estimation results of equation 1 reported in Table H2 of Appendix H. 
   
 
It is expected that well-functioning banking institutions play an important role not only in the 
saving mobilisation, but also in the diversification of risk, the identification of investment 
opportunities and the contribution to the gross fixed capital formation.  
Table H3 of Appendix H reports the results obtained for the gross fixed capital formation and the 
results are also summarised in Table 3 below. The important role of the banking institutions to 
the gross fixed capital formation is well supported by the very clear positive influence of the 
DEA bank cost efficiency, reinforcing the idea that efficient banking institutions will surely 
contribute to the increase of the gross capital formation.  
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At the same time, and in line with the results already obtained for the GDP and the final 
consumption expenditure, the bank market concentration measures show a clear negative 
influence, particularly of the HHI, supporting the hypothesis that bank market concentration 
could be associated to less competition (defended, among others, by Bikker and Haaf, 2002 and 
Schaeck and Cihak, 2008) and also to lesser efforts in the selection of the most profitable 
projects. 
Now, and contrary to our previous results for GDP and final consumption, the influences of 
ROA and ROE ratios are not only statistically irrelevant, but also negative. The explanation may 
be connected to the fact that the application of the financial resources in the gross fixed capital 
formation is an alternative to the other possible applications of these financial resources and also 
to the recognised increasing role of the non-traditional activities to explain the banking returns. 
Table 3 – Summary of the results obtained for gross fixed capital formation 
Explanatory variables (model 1) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 2) Effect 
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -   Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation - 
DEA bank cost efficiency + ***  DEA bank cost efficiency + *** 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - **  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -  
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -   Return on assets (ROA) ratio -  
Constant +  **  Constant +  ** 
     
Explanatory variables (model 3) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 4) Effect 
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -  Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation - 
DEA bank cost efficiency + ***  DEA bank cost efficiency + *** 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - **  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -  
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -   Return on equity (ROE) ratio -  
Constant +  **  Constant +   
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** 
statistically significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Estimation results of equation 1 reported in Table H3 of Appendix H. 
 
The results obtained for the exports of goods and services are presented in Table H4 of Appendix 
H and summarised below in Table 4. The results confirm that exports have their own dynamics 
(their “lags” are statistically significant) and mostly depend on other factors like the decisions of 
the rest of the world (here represented by the “constants”, which are also statistically significant). 
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With reference to the influence of our explanatory variables, in general, they are not statistically 
significant, although their influences are in line with the results obtained for GDP (with the 
exception of the DEA cost efficiency, although this is clearly statistically not significant). 
However, in three of the considered models, the growth of bank market concentration, 
particularly when it is measured through the HHI, clearly has a negative influence on the growth 
rate of the exports of goods and services.   
 
Table 4 – Summary of the results obtained for exports of goods and services 
Explanatory variables (model 1) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 2) Effect 
Lag1 Exports - *   Lag1 Exports - * 
DEA bank cost efficiency -   DEA bank cost efficiency -  
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - *  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -  
Return on assets (ROA) ratio +   Return on assets (ROA) ratio +  
Constant + **  Constant + ** 
     
Explanatory variables (model 3) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 4) Effect 
Lag1 Exports + *  Lag1 Exports - * 
DEA bank cost efficiency -   DEA bank cost efficiency -  
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - *  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - * 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio +   Return on equity (ROE) ratio +  
Constant + **  Constant + ** 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** 
statistically significant at 1%. 
 
Source: Estimation results of equation 1 reported in Table H4 of Appendix H. 
 
 
The results obtained for the imports of goods and services (presented in Table H5 of Appendix H 
and summarised in Table 5 below) are very similar to those already reported for the gross fixed 
capital formation, revealing that the dynamics of the imports of goods and services reflect the 
business and production cycle (when usually gross fixed capital formation also increases). The 
DEA bank cost efficiency reveals its positive influence on the growth of imports of goods and 
services, although it is not statistically significant. At the same time, and confirming all the 
previous results, the growth of bank market concentration has a negative influence on the growth 
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of the imports of goods and services, and now this influence is clearly statistically significant, 
both for the HHI and C3 concentration measures. 
 
Table 5 – Summary of the results obtained for imports of goods and services 
Explanatory variables (model 1) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 2) Effect 
Lag1 Imports - (*)   Lag1 Imports - (**) 
DEA bank cost efficiency +  DEA bank cost efficiency + 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - (**)  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - (**) 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -   Return on assets (ROA) ratio -  
Constant + (**)  Constant + (**) 
     
Explanatory variables (model 3) Effect  Explanatory variables (model 4) Effect 
Lag1 Imports - (**)  Lag1 Imports - (**) 
DEA bank cost efficiency +  DEA bank cost efficiency + 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure - (**)  Bank market concentration  (C3) measure - (*) 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -   Return on equity (ROE) ratio -  
Constant + (**)  Constant + (**) 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect. * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** 
statistically significant at 1%. 
 




5. Summary and conclusions  
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence of the importance to economic growth of the 
performance of the banking institutions, particularly of bank efficiency, measured through Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), bank cost efficiency and bank market concentration, measured 
both by the percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest banking institutions (C3) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The influence of these bank and market conditions, 
including also as control variables, the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE), is 
tested not only on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also on its components: the final 
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consumption expenditure, the gross fixed capital formation, goods and services exports and 
goods and services imports.  
We consider a panel of all 27 EU member states for the time period between 1996 and 2008. The 
macroeconomic data are sourced from the Eurostat statistical database, and all financial and bank 
performance variables are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD, including the available 
annual data from consolidated accounts of the commercial and saving banks.  
Our results confirm the assumption that well-functioning financial institutions will contribute 
positively to economic growth (empirically confirmed by the large strand of literature mostly 
following the pioneering contribution of King and Levine, 1993). During the considered 12 
years, a period when all EU member states were preparing either for the new market conditions 
of the European Monetary Union, or to become a new EU member, or indeed to confront all of 
these changes and challenges, just before the current financial crisis, there is clear evidence of a 
generally positive influence of bank cost efficiency on economic growth. However, this 
influence is statistically more significant for GDP and particularly for the gross fixed capital 
formation. Regarding the bank market concentration, our results are in line with those obtained 
by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), among others, since concentration has a generally negative 
influence on GDP and on its components, this influence being statistically more significant for 
the gross fixed capital formation, for the export and import of goods and services.  
A more careful analysis of the results obtained for the GDP and its components, considering the 
estimation of four models, all of them including the first lag of the correspondent dependent 
variable, the year and the country dummies (the specific results for which are not reported, but 
are available on request) and the constant, as well as the different combinations of the two 
measures of bank market concentration (HHI or C3) and of the two control variables (ROA or 
ROE), allow us to conclude that: 
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• In all models, the obtained F statistics and the relatively high (for panel data) R-squares 
point to the validity of the estimation results for GDP. Furthermore, there is clear and 
statistically significant evidence of the positive influence of the growth of the DEA bank 
cost efficiency, as well as on the ROA and the ROE ratios on the GDP growth rate. 
• For the final consumption expenditure, the obtained results, although completely in line 
with those obtained for GDP, are now statistically less relevant, revealing that the final 
consumption expenditure may be an important part of the GDP aggregate expenditure but 
the growth rate of the final consumption has its own dynamics and is less dependent on 
the market and bank cost efficiency conditions than the other components of GDP. 
• With regard to the growth rate of the gross fixed capital formation, there is statistically 
strong evidence of the positive influence of the growth of the DEA bank cost efficiency, 
confirming the important role of well-functioning banking institutions in increasing the 
gross capital formation. Moreover, the negative effect of the bank market concentration 
growth is also clear and statistically highly significant when concentration is measured 
through the Helfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
• The results obtained for the exports of goods and services, although mostly in line with 
those reported for GDP and final consumption, are now statistically less relevant, 
confirming that the exports growth rate mainly depends on its own dynamics and most 
particularly on “other factors”, like the decisions of the rest of the world. 
• The particular inertia of the growth rate of the imports of goods and services is also clear, 
but there is evidence that imports go in line with the business cycle, together with the 
gross fixed capital and GDP growth rates. There is also statistical evidence of the 
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Appendix A - Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
DEA was originally presented in Charnes et al. (1978), assuming constant returns to scale, which 
can be accepted as optimal but only in the long run.  Later, Banker et al. (1984) introduced an 
additional convexity constraint (λ) and allowed for variable returns to scale. Following also Coelli 
et al. (1998),  Thanassoulis (2001) and  Thanassoulis et al. (2007), we can assume that at any time 
t, there are N decision-making units (DMUs) that use a set of X inputs (X = x1, x2, ..., xk) to 
produce a set of Y outputs (Y = y1, y2, ..., ym), thus obtaining the DEA input-oriented efficiency 
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The DEA approach provides, for every i decision-making unit (DMU, here every country’s 
banking sector), a scalar efficiency score (θi  ≤ 1). If θi = 1, the DMU lies on the efficient frontier 
and will be considered an efficient unit. On the contrary, if θi < 1, the DMU lies below the 
efficient frontier and will be considered an inefficient unit; moreover, (1- θi) will always be the 
measure of its inefficiency.  
 
In the present study, the data are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD and the sample 
comprises annual data from the consolidated accounts of the commercial and savings banks of all 
EU countries between 1996 and 2008. 
For the DEA estimates, we define the outputs and the input prices of the cost function, using the 
following variables: 
 
 Outputs:  
1. Total loans = natural logarithm of the loans 
2. Total securities = natural logarithm of the total securities 
3. Other earning assets = natural logarithm of the difference between the total earning assets and the 
total loans 
Inputs: 
1. Price of borrowed funds = natural logarithm of the ratio interest expenses over the sum of 
deposits 
2. Price of physical capital = natural logarithm of the ratio non-interest expenses over fixed asset 












Appendix B – Yearly number of banks by EU country 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 72 122 124 124 129 140 142 146 154 153 162 162 147 
Belgium 97 91 75 73 68 69 72 73 72 71 58 47 34 
Bulgaria 16 19 22 21 25 27 28 29 30 30 29 22 21 
Cyprus 17 23 25 21 23 23 24 18 17 16 11 11 9 
Czech Rep. 28 28 25 25 27 28 27 26 31 27 25 25 20 
Denmark 113 113 117 118 123 116 113 112 129 120 123 121 109 
Estonia 16 18 8 8 10 10 11 11 12 11 11 12 10 
Finland  11 12 12 12 14 13 12 14 19 16 11 11 12 
France 345 323 312 306 308 305 295 283 292 283 256 237 204 
Germany 827 830 818 791 771 737 708 682 675 677 685 675 593 
Greece 29 35 33 30 26 26 31 34 55 35 33 30 29 
Hungary 34 33 34 37 39 35 37 33 33 36 35 31 26 
Ireland 34 36 40 40 42 44 46 47 63 51 50 47 40 
Italy 200 219 219 228 216 229 232 240 363 304 226 222 199 
Latvia 21 25 24 24 25 26 27 30 33 36 36 36 33 
Lithuania 11 13 13 14 16 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 15 
Luxembourg 122 123 117 123 112 100 96 92 93 91 92 105 80 
Malta 9 9 10 8 10 9 9 14 16 17 18 17 14 
Netherlands 64 58 57 55 50 55 61 60 77 58 57 54 41 
Poland 47 51 47 49 50 45 48 52 73 56 45 43 37 
Portugal 41 44 44 43 37 36 33 32 44 34 31 31 25 
Romania 8 11 27 30 31 30 31 29 32 29 29 28 27 
Slovakia 19 23 24 20 22 20 21 19 19 25 17 17 16 
Slovenia 29 29 24 26 25 23 20 20 23 29 23 22 21 
Spain 206 216 207 198 204 213 211 208 256 192 184 151 136 
Sweden 16 15 17 21 22 104 103 103 101 103 99 92 78 
UK 191 196 200 195 195 197 204 206 257 203 190 170 148 
 
This Appendix presents the annual number of banks (commercial and saving banks) for each 
EU country included in our sample. All data are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD 






















Appendix C – Yearly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) cost efficiency measures of the EU 
member states 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 0.702 0.629 0.595 0.760 0.720 0.616 0.643 0.694 0.676 0.707 0.662 0.678 0.715 
Belgium 0.950 0.887 0.903 0.983 0.826 0.911 0.793 0.958 0.594 0.819 0.672 0.463 0.478 
Bulgaria 0.149 0.270 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.970 0.937 0.832 1.000 1.000 0.915 
Cyprus 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.914 0.725 0.695 0.679 0.837 0.800 0.937 
Czech Rep. 0.945 0.803 0.579 0.632 0.859 0.741 0.681 0.716 0.838 0.897 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Denmark 0.926 0.853 0.830 0.785 0.668 0.525 0.607 0.776 0.780 0.734 0.928 0.722 0.536 
Estonia 1.000 0.864 0.730 0.647 0.717 0.765 0.621 0.587 0.760 0.777 0.893 0.711 0.669 
Finland  0.783 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.737 1.000 0.687 0.677 1.000 0.905 1.000 0.845 0.579 
France 0.818 0.699 0.687 0.739 0.552 0.547 0.578 0.576 0.531 0.577 0.606 0.597 0.712 
Germany 0.948 0.889 1.000 0.981 0.772 0.762 0.887 0.934 0.956 0.776 0.821 0.699 0.606 
Greece 0.754 0.685 0.643 0.604 0.734 0.781 0.949 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.967 0.991 
Hungary 0.334 0.298 0.365 0.367 0.539 0.504 0.402 0.485 0.434 0.433 0.523 0.500 0.495 
Ireland 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.849 0.959 
Italy 1.000 0.872 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.802 0.921 0.924 1.000 0.958 0.984 0.741 0.740 
Latvia 1.000 1.000 0.990 1.000 1.000 0.947 0.885 0.910 0.991 0.827 0.839 0.721 0.729 
Lithuania 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.778 
Luxembourg 0.879 0.690 0.730 0.696 0.654 0.508 0.564 0.697 0.673 0.757 0.523 0.544 0.524 
Malta 1.000 0.911 0.953 0.888 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Netherlands 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.874 0.764 0.759 0.748 0.852 0.822 0.779 0.821 0.882 0.564 
Poland 0.700 0.591 0.708 0.596 0.597 0.604 0.528 0.593 0.616 0.605 0.985 1.000 0.928 
Portugal 0.894 0.808 0.836 1.000 0.824 0.638 0.538 0.438 0.512 0.562 0.641 0.599 0.584 
Romania 0.612 0.596 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.986 0.925 0.886 0.998 0.855 
Slovakia 1.000 0.823 0.596 0.613 0.639 0.658 0.715 0.753 0.833 0.839 0.953 0.902 1.000 
Slovenia 0.803 0.732 0.712 0.868 0.856 0.842 0.675 0.620 0.585 0.808 0.855 0.873 0.809 
Spain 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sweden 0.632 0.675 0.708 0.724 0.514 0.638 0.677 0.695 0.589 0.626 0.695 0.509 0.440 
UK 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
This Appendix presents the cost efficiency results obtained with DEA, considering three 
outputs (total loans,  total securities, and other earning assets) and three inputs (price of borrowed 





Appendix D – Concentration measures: C3 and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
C3 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 42.28 46.12 58.71 59.64 54.26 56.40 50.14 50.14 42.84 50.12 45.57 49.84 45.05 
Belgium 32.40 31.41 44.75 58.77 58.84 59.38 59.38 54.00 54.92 44.92 54.87 56.82 57.25 
Bulgaria 78.59 62.84 55.10 52.88 52.88 48.57 42.49 38.37 34.01 33.38 31.14 32.59 30.37 
Cyprus 64.73 61.49 60.84 61.36 52.08 50.55 53.64 66.62 65.92 72.44 77.36 72.89 71.89 
Czech Rep. 50.68 49.99 46.33 51.33 55.75 54.63 53.71 54.17 41.63 42.47 41.77 42.13 40.58 
Denmark 52.80 46.74 46.88 43.11 50.00 56.01 57.17 58.36 52.60 59.80 59.06 60.89 60.38 
Estonia 42.25 40.39 75.83 77.06 77.98 80.54 80.58 80.69 86.99 87.11 88.17 84.99 89.29 
Finland  73.67 76.35 78.06 74.08 76.14 83.78 87.60 80.54 74.51 74.69 79.52 79.45 79.4 
France 24.56 27.77 28.93 34.96 34.19 35.79 31.35 31.81 30.29 32.87 33.90 35.05 36.61 
Germany 18.74 16.03 21.75 22.68 24.83 24.08 21.11 21.96 22.08 25.51 27.97 32.78 36.08 
Greece 48.29 45.19 43.02 39.71 41.20 41.11 39.4 38.41 24.02 36.59 35.58 38.19 37.67 
Hungary 39.21 45.94 33.60 32.49 30.37 32.20 33.96 39.03 39.66 37.64 39.25 37.67 35.26 
Ireland 57.68 58.00 48.35 50.95 50.64 45.96 49.87 47.69 35.84 42.16 43.44 43.03 43.95 
Italy 19.05 20.26 23.80 24.24 25.55 27.97 25.55 25.28 24.51 34.25 44.09 49.38 48.47 
Latvia 41.90 41.55 49.77 46.27 39.28 35.97 36.38 32.79 30.43 32.67 35.76 33.60 35.30 
Lithuania 51.37 51.09 58.95 70.92 69.44 66.43 64.76 56.17 53.25 51.23 50.49 47.70 46.58 
Luxembourg 17.05 16.64 17.92 17.34 18.06 19.44 22.29 22.03 21.28 21.13 20.71 16.78 18.9 
27 
 
Malta 91.28 91.48 90.80 96.41 89.93 92.27 91.18 80.82 79.05 78.00 68.85 81.26 80.51 
Netherlands 72.29 78.75 81.86 81.28 80.50 81.86 85.40 78.45 65.99 73.22 80.55 71.67 64.27 
Poland 47.46 39.18 39.03 39.15 33.09 36.22 33.49 30.49 20.03 31.27 30.79 33.42 28.4 
Portugal 32.46 28.90 30.56 31.00 45.10 42.92 46.01 48.25 41.15 54.49 56.48 54.00 53.78 
Romania 96.56 85.88 60.93 63.28 58.69 55.34 53.98 58.79 50.89 50.86 49.44 52.14 47.75 
Slovakia 71.20 62.95 50.94 57.74 57.72 56.66 56.80 57.34 62.12 45.87 56.82 52.38 55.02 
Slovenia 41.63 44.77 45.80 42.42 45.54 51.81 51.97 59.51 56.74 52.77 49.06 50.93 48.18 
Spain 31.36 33.82 33.63 38.46 38.21 36.51 32.81 31.89 31.44 36.11 32.98 33.15 32.72 
Sweden 43.01 47.21 46.17 46.31 47.48 47.18 49.58 48.51 56.27 58.03 57.67 56.75 54.78 




Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 913 1023 1281 1564 1622 1626 1419 1229 941 1221 1049 1311 1084 
Belgium 758 733 1035 1659 1628 1900 1638 1336 1375 978 1445 1499 1499 
Bulgaria 2487 1972 1395 1394 1242 1040 846 827 745 741 690 756 673 
Cyprus 1799 1613 1560 1608 1356 1278 1315 1837 1899 2199 2719 2242 2308 
Czech Rep. 1182 1160 1113 1289 1366 1321 1282 1296 935 1015 1018 1004 1004 
Denmark 1209 1106 1106 1017 1268 1479 1519 1511 1194 1577 1542 1615 1570 
Estonia 1014 997 2274 2411 2516 2867 2828 2849 3720 4025 4218 3378 3378 
Finland  2237 2335 2375 2236 2386 3767 4311 2877 1947 2511 2758 2793 2857 
France 420 455 472 595 581 601 513 537 519 586 626 649 682 
Germany 283 262 344 355 385 376 320 341 336 390 392 535 624 
Greece 1099 981 914 792 896 899 869 856 485 870 812 853 845 
Hungary 806 869 665 643 589 645 660 796 835 821 885 857 798 
Ireland 1375 1410 1071 1171 1172 1023 1129 1081 815 886 963 1006 1065 
Italy 333 326 397 412 431 469 437 411 401 591 807 1051 1025 
Latvia 907 822 1028 932 847 865 828 744 660 716 750 697 735 
Lithuania 1368 1329 1500 1944 1823 1696 1613 1362 1265 1256 1174 1079 1057 
Luxembourg 301 299 333 330 346 371 398 392 366 381 365 276 318 
Malta 3731 3759 3699 4156 3578 3680 3706 2683 2437 2370 1938 2639 2606 
Netherlands 2061 2541 2647 2569 2543 2581 3232 2620 1597 2110 2418 1895 1701 
Poland 962 714 794 687 597 731 668 583 377 612 613 645 550 
Portugal 663 584 624 629 1025 997 1103 1158 1036 1273 1393 1310 1327 
Romania 4249 2626 1733 1582 1388 1324 1254 1408 1160 1150 1102 1103 972 
Slovakia 2127 1766 1240 1486 1443 1308 1301 1330 1437 978 1306 1202 1253 
Slovenia 927 1032 1043 901 1017 1195 1218 1338 1234 1080 1130 1195 1087 
Spain 464 502 507 600 645 600 515 500 482 654 565 561 563 
Sweden 1148 1255 1243 1239 1253 1225 1298 1281 1575 1632 1598 1605 1563 
UK 502 493 423 463 466 480 514 517 397 542 529 612 654 
 
 
This Appendix presents the obtained yearly EU countries’ concentration measures with the C3 (that is, 
the percentage share of the total assets held by the three largest banking institutions) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (also for the total assets, the HHI is calculated as the sum of the 












Appendix E – Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
 
ROA 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 0.0026 0.00345 0.00286 0.00403 0.00419 0.00325 0.00252 0.00348 0.00375 0.00462 0.00902 0.00586 -0.00142 
Belgium 0.00302 0.00302 0.00287 0.00468 0.0057 0.00555 0.00387 0.00456 0.00431 0.00461 0.00684 0.00334 -0.01741 
Bulgaria 0.05388 0.0967 0.00694 0.01875 0.02756 0.0168 0.01766 0.02099 0.01911 0.02024 0.01917 0.02198 0.02267 
Cyprus 0.00389 0.00377 0.00541 0.01176 0.01105 0.00705 -0.00211 -0.0002 0.00202 0.00476 0.00888 0.01536 0.0116 
Czech Rep. 0.00324 -0.00751 -0.00996 -0.00912 0.00383 0.00149 0.01318 0.01391 0.01344 0.01442 0.01357 0.0137 0.01222 
Denmark 0.00834 0.00804 0.0072 0.00615 0.00603 0.00511 0.00455 0.00656 0.00565 0.00669 0.00719 0.00557 -0.00063 
Estonia 0.02395 0.02263 -0.01593 0.01879 0.0171 0.02385 0.02386 0.02296 0.02127 0.01772 0.01719 0.02002 0.01383 
Finland  0.00365 0.00862 0.00448 0.00815 0.01414 0.01517 0.00474 0.01658 0.00773 0.00868 0.00884 0.00965 0.00502 
France 0.00073 0.00165 0.00269 0.00314 0.00481 0.00388 0.00349 0.00386 0.00497 0.00443 0.00571 0.00282 -0.00105 
Germany 0.00231 0.00222 0.00377 0.00219 0.00399 -0.00018 -0.0019 -0.00203 0.00051 0.00269 0.00359 0.00388 -0.00223 
Greece 0.00559 0.00606 0.00721 0.02243 0.0131 0.00954 0.00489 0.00747 0.00536 0.00921 0.00834 0.01075 0.0043 
Hungary 0.01177 0.01083 -0.00029 0.00374 0.0114 0.0136 0.01482 0.01735 0.02394 0.01839 0.01721 0.01623 0.01344 
Ireland 0.00687 0.00695 0.00766 0.00733 0.006 0.00464 0.00439 0.00522 0.00548 0.00551 0.0063 0.00611 0.0008 
Italy 0.00201 0.00071 0.00462 0.00634 0.00728 0.00536 0.00433 0.00505 0.00608 0.00727 0.00775 0.00641 0.00419 
Latvia 0.03149 0.02642 -0.06331 0.00926 0.01632 0.01551 0.01397 0.01374 0.01609 0.01839 0.01712 0.01735 0.00019 
Lithuania -0.00612 0.00592 0.01042 0.01309 0.00778 0.00381 0.00829 0.01133 0.00999 0.00874 0.01178 0.01446 0.00947 
Luxembourg 0.00426 0.00419 0.00543 0.00405 0.00469 0.00505 0.00516 0.00544 0.00493 0.00574 0.00857 0.00627 0.00262 
Malta 0.00857 0.00941 0.00772 0.00757 0.01091 0.00818 0.00659 0.00876 0.01008 0.01233 0.01164 0.00941 -0.00227 
Netherlands 0.00689 0.00675 0.00682 0.0067 0.00834 0.00707 0.00453 0.0061 0.00509 0.00688 0.00686 0.00805 -0.00883 
Poland 0.0217 0.01648 0.00751 0.0107 0.01053 0.00763 0.00429 0.00355 0.01339 0.01722 0.0171 0.01973 0.016 
Portugal 0.00586 0.00756 0.0075 0.0079 0.00914 0.00725 0.00654 0.00683 0.00509 0.00652 0.00755 0.00721 0.00288 
Romania 0.00241 0.00074 -0.009 0.02758 0.02114 0.02552 0.01705 0.01196 0.02172 0.01683 0.01594 0.0131 0.0202 
Slovakia 0.00182 -0.00696 -0.02133 0.01443 0.0153 0.01043 0.01232 0.0131 0.01082 0.00999 0.01105 0.0115 0.00873 
Slovenia 0.01058 0.00956 0.01151 0.00645 0.01095 0.00511 0.00706 0.00615 0.00767 0.0073 0.00899 0.00929 0.00439 
Spain 0.00619 0.00698 0.00783 0.00803 0.00826 0.00808 0.00764 0.00773 0.00747 0.00773 0.0089 0.00978 0.0069 
Sweden 0.00945 0.00487 0.00717 0.00674 0.00756 0.00888 0.0045 0.00582 0.00885 0.00683 0.00677 0.00658 0.00454 




 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 0.07012 0.08268 0.0717 0.10285 0.1149 0.08425 0.06325 0.07434 0.08538 0.09875 0.16321 0.09107 -0.02699 
Belgium 0.10145 0.09688 0.08235 0.13048 0.1604 0.17411 0.10844 0.13201 0.13042 0.15421 0.21715 0.07971 -0.52826 
Bulgaria 0.43574 0.64501 0.04117 0.10237 0.15356 0.11381 0.12309 0.14553 0.16157 0.17414 0.17626 0.19653 0.18565 
Cyprus 0.06761 0.0682 0.0941 0.15086 0.11837 0.08053 -0.02424 -0.00296 0.03704 0.09008 0.11125 0.15764 0.13239 
Czech Rep. 0.04608 -0.11873 -0.15207 -0.14085 0.05733 0.02374 0.18834 0.18377 0.16247 0.17876 0.17501 0.20417 0.14958 
Denmark 0.13266 0.14013 0.12551 0.11145 0.11017 0.10189 0.09585 0.13581 0.12381 0.13881 0.13917 0.11885 -0.01584 
Estonia 0.26234 0.25425 -0.10693 0.12701 0.12888 0.18962 0.18476 0.18313 0.20602 0.20292 0.22375 0.25453 0.14777 
Finland  0.07584 0.1886 0.09463 0.16671 0.22149 0.23956 0.07312 0.17018 0.08563 0.1005 0.0965 0.13678 0.09833 
France 0.02058 0.0491 0.07574 0.08075 0.12459 0.10213 0.08729 0.09581 0.13134 0.12659 0.15251 0.08743 -0.03695 
Germany 0.0647 0.06262 0.10468 0.06207 0.10063 -0.00403 -0.0478 -0.05344 0.0154 0.07803 0.10829 0.11397 -0.07949 
Greece 0.12395 0.12592 0.12222 0.21942 0.15107 0.12468 0.07597 0.11189 0.08771 0.13803 0.11176 0.1466 0.0771 
Hungary 0.20067 0.14938 -0.00464 0.05168 0.14947 0.17457 0.17517 0.19713 0.2474 0.21231 0.189 0.18294 0.16369 
Ireland 0.10778 0.11656 0.12663 0.12916 0.09938 0.09332 0.10073 0.13648 0.13956 0.1512 0.1691 0.16367 0.0252 
Italy 0.03248 0.01212 0.07539 0.10621 0.12109 0.08584 0.06809 0.07376 0.09107 0.09731 0.11052 0.07958 0.05588 
Latvia 0.2347 0.21165 -0.79227 0.09451 0.18878 0.16992 0.15678 0.15339 0.18947 0.22583 0.21638 0.20573 0.0024 
Lithuania -0.0944 0.06697 0.08455 0.10784 0.06946 0.03556 0.07332 0.1123 0.11137 0.11295 0.16206 0.19346 0.11498 
Luxembourg 0.13237 0.13567 0.15398 0.11146 0.12008 0.12174 0.11354 0.12027 0.10508 0.12224 0.17984 0.13193 0.05362 
Malta 0.15712 0.16442 0.10927 0.10722 0.1479 0.1102 0.08934 0.05892 0.07043 0.09368 0.08918 0.08777 -0.02371 
Netherlands 0.1077 0.11702 0.12257 0.13324 0.14828 0.13617 0.0971 0.13562 0.15143 0.16493 0.166 0.16065 -0.25869 
Poland 0.24709 0.1869 0.08864 0.12328 0.11412 0.08001 0.04391 0.03965 0.12701 0.16575 0.16663 0.19204 0.17613 
Portugal 0.09731 0.12965 0.11553 0.12514 0.16528 0.13154 0.10931 0.10743 0.08646 0.11704 0.11874 0.11894 0.05323 
Romania 0.03886 0.00847 -0.07063 0.17422 0.12891 0.14468 0.10438 0.08074 0.1699 0.15345 0.16463 0.15455 0.22711 
Slovakia 0.03798 -0.14916 -0.82112 0.23768 0.21061 0.13332 0.13958 0.14107 0.12162 0.12898 0.15206 0.15506 0.11975 
Slovenia 0.09374 0.08089 0.11398 0.06774 0.11554 0.05954 0.08655 0.07417 0.09183 0.09395 0.11265 0.11967 0.05467 
Spain 0.10724 0.1181 0.12561 0.12915 0.11746 0.1159 0.1095 0.11587 0.10342 0.11944 0.13925 0.15256 0.11552 
Sweden 0.23566 0.12267 0.19192 0.16768 0.20256 0.22153 0.115 0.13852 0.20442 0.16303 0.16075 0.16533 0.1289 
UK 0.14577 0.12942 0.16932 0.14853 0.14254 0.12455 0.11284 0.13373 0.15684 0.14866 0.15404 0.15892 -0.00381 
 
 
This Appendix presents the obtained yearly EU countries’ bank performance measures: the return on 




Appendix F – Panel unit root tests 
 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LEVINLIN) tests:  
 
Variables coefficient t-star P > t 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the GDP  -0.91877       -12.12891       0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the final consumption -0.89094 -11.08223 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the gross fixed capital formation -0.87761 -9.74921 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the exports -0.98552 -13.34454 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the imports -0.79163 -9.83498 0.0000 
Natural logarithm of DEA bank cost efficiency  -0.43473 -4.25875 0.0000 
Natural logarithm of  bank market concentration  (C3) measure -0.25417 -5.02867 0.0000 
Natural logarithm of  bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -0.28545 -6.12162 0.0000 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -0.80155 -9.52113 0.0000 





Appendix G – Summary statistics and correlations of the used series 
 
Summary statistics 
Variables (*) Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max Observations 
GDP 
OVERALL .0730185 .0562873 
 
-.1317225 .2970152 N =324 
BETWEEN  .0349147 .0210996 .1360545 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0446177 -.1524267 .2422771 T = 12 










.2857208 N =324 
BETWEEN  .0341886 .017408 .1296475 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0408487 -.1574834 .228831 T = 12 
      
Gross fixed capital 
formation 
OVERALL .0824035 .0969665 -.2301245 .4663296 N =324 
BETWEEN  .0477779 .0098286 .2006463 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0848381 -.2398363 .3632473 T = 12 
      
Exports 
OVERALL .0924583 .081342 -.129406 .5417948 N =324 
BETWEEN  .0344537 .0488713 .1500353 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0739588 -.1836856 .5052467 T = 12 
      
Imports 
OVERALL .0960796 .082196 -.1556988 .4779053 N =324 
BETWEEN  .0342585 .0574718 .1627179 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0749834 -.1747626 .411267 T = 12 
      
DEA bank cost 
efficiency 
OVERALL -.2407343 .263962 -1.903809 0 N =351 
BETWEEN  .1907762 -.8439925 0 i = 27 
WITHIN  .1858178 -1.869049 .1695398 T = 13 
      
C3 concentration 
measure 
OVERALL 3.806431 .3997409 2.774462 4.570165 N =351 
30 
 
BETWEEN  .3719245 2.949454 4.444684 i = 27 
WITHIN  .1618877 3.198322 4.393741 T = 13 
      
HHI concentration 
measure 
OVERALL 6.949937 .6210185 5.568116 8.368878 N =351 
BETWEEN  .5865469 5.836045 8.030219 i = 27 
WITHIN  .2311326 5.996883 8.00785 T = 13 
      
ROA 
OVERALL .0082816 .0094148 -.06331 .0967 N =351 
BETWEEN  .0053291 .0014469 .0278808 i = 27 
WITHIN  .0078239 -.0652238 .0771008 T = 13 
      
ROE 
OVERALL .1105632 .1080092 -.82112 .64501 N =351 
BETWEEN  .037707 .0404331 .2041869 i = 27 










Exports Imports DEA C3 HHI ROA ROE 















1.000        
Exports 0.5782 0.4658 0.4050 1.000       
Imports 0.6228 0.5533 0.6058 0.9023 1.000      
DEA 0.1548 0.1500 0.2145 0.0143 0.0547 1.000     
C3 0.0665 0.0933 -0.0096 -0.0211 -0.0530 0.0494 1.000    
HHI 0.0702 0.0946 -0.0167 -0.0164 -0.0530 0.0336 0.9818 1.000   
ROA 0.3276 0.2898 0.1314 0.2303 0.2338 -0.0443 0.0933 0.1175 1.000  
ROE 0.2075 0.1449 0.0459 0.1419 0.1324 -0.0028 0.0023 0.0348 0.8064 1.000 
 
(*) More precisely, the variables used are: 
      GDP = First difference of the natural logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product 
      Final consumption = First difference of the natural logarithm of the final consumption 
      Gross fixed capital formation = First difference of the natural logarithm of the gross fixed capital formation 
      Exports = First difference of the natural logarithm of the exports 
      Imports = First difference of the natural logarithm of the imports 
      DEA bank cost efficiency = Natural logarithm of the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) bank cost efficiency 
      C3 concentration measure = Natural logarithm of the bank market concentration (C3) measure 
      HHI concentration measure = Natural logarithm of the bank market concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) measure 
      ROA = Return on assets ratio 











Appendix H – Estimation results of the model represented by the equation 1(*) for GDP and 
its components (**) 
 
 
Table H1 – GDP 
 
 Estim. Coefiicient Standard Error t-statistic P-value 
Model 1     
Lag1 GDP -.0071848         .003807 -1.89    0.060 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0300956    .0148715      2.02    0.044 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0143891    .0113649     -1.27    0.207 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio .5765727    .2993796      1.93    0.055 
Constant .136441    .0771146      1.77    0.078 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.53 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =  0.51     
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 2     
Lag1 GDP -.0072858    .0038125     -1.91    0.057     
DEA bank cost efficiency .030228         .0152627 1.98    0.049 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0186492    .0173772     -1.07    0.284 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio .5573989    .3028159      1.84    0.067 
Constant .1066834    .0638236      1.67    0.096 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.19 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =  0.51     
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 3     
Lag1 GDP -.0073208     .003697     -1.98    0.049 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0249126    .0149545      1.67    0.097 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0143963    .0112594     -1.28    0.202 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0571032    .0216469      2.64    0.009 
Constant .1335425     1.75    0.082 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.37 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.51       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 4     
Lag1 GDP -.0073991    .0036963     -2.00    0.046 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0252481    .0151935      1.66    0.098     
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.018443    .0170693     -1.08    0.281 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0558858     .021638      2.58    0.010 
Constant .1030202    .0629114      1.64    0.103 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.05    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.51       









Table H2 – Final consumption 
 
 Estim. Coefiicient Standard Error t-statistic P-value 
Model 1     
Lag1 Final consumption -.0061036           .0039308 -1.55 0.122 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0204266            .0147358 1.39 0.167 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0087379    .0109251        -0.80 0.425 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio 2645169     .310571         0.85 0.395 
Constant .1056773    .0736742         1.43 0.153 
 F( 41,   281) =   11.91    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.48       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 2     
Lag1 Final consumption -.0062289    .0039245     -1.59    0.114 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0191408     .015116      1.27    0.206 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0156481    .0165433        -0.95 0.345 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio .2463248    .3118491      0.79    0.430 
Constant .1040328    .0598293         1.74 0.083 
 F( 41,   281) =   11.77 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.48       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 3     
Lag1 Final consumption -.0059839        .0038121 -1.57    0.118 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0176473    .0147898      1.19    0.234 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0086698    .0108329     -0.80    0.424 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0346203    .0211535      1.64    0.103 
Constant .103507    .0731082      1.42    0.158 
 F( 41,   281) =   11.94    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.48       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 4     
Lag1 Final consumption -.0060845    .0038017     -1.60    0.111 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0166097    .0150126      1.11    0.270 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0151678    .0162347     -0.93    0.351 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0335062    .0209705      1.60    0.111   
Constant .1005776    .0588447      1.71    0.089 
 F( 41,   281) =   11.80    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =  0.48      









Table H3 – Gross fixed capital formation 
 
 Estim. Coefiicient Standard Error t-statistic P-value 
Model 1     
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -.0086819    .0062959     -1.38    0.169 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0805218    .0300559      2.68    0.008 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0465085    .0233284     -1.99    0.047 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -1.398121    .9409315     -1.49    0.138 
Constant .3462776         .1644267 2.11    0.036 
 F( 41,   281) =    5.95 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.42       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 2     
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -.008731    .0063164     -1.38    0.168 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0850035    .0304422      2.79    0.006 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0472685    .0330015     -1.43    0.153   
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -1.438665    .9446563     -1.52    0.129 
Constant .3462776    .1644267         2.11 0.036      
 F( 41,   281) =    5.72 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.42       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 3     
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -.0071703    .0062881     -1.14    0.255 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0907374    .0334168      2.72    0.007 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0460204    .0235382     -1.96    0.052 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -.0933274    .0705539     -1.32    0.187 
Constant .3480401    .1657073      2.10    0.037 
 F( 41,   281) =    5.96    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =  0.42      
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 4     
Lag1 Gross fixed capital formation -.0071577    .0063471     -1.13    0.260 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0958274    .0341574      2.81    0.005      
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0455535    .0334307     -1.36    0.174 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -.0958592    .0704921        -1.36 0.175 
Constant .1994248     .129321      1.54    0.124 
 F( 41,   281) =    5.72 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =  0.41      














Table H4 – Exports of goods and services 
 
 Estim. Coefiicient Standard Error t-statistic P-value 
Model 1     
Lag1 Exports of goods and services -.0081474        .0048716 -1.67    0.096 
DEA bank cost efficiency -.0006868    .0179542     -0.04    0.970 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.039573    .0224389        -1.76 0.079 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio .1772964    .3978669      0.45    0.656 
Constant .333854    .1589434      2.10    0.037 
 F( 41,   281) =   14.17 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.55       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 2     
Lag1 Exports of goods and services -.0085633    .0050788        -1.69 0.093 
DEA bank cost efficiency -.0014427    .0184145     -0.08    0.938 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0550607    .0338401        -1.63 0.105 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio .1168983    .4198096      0.28    0.781 
Constant .2662168    .1310428      2.03    0.043 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.92    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.55       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 3     
Lag1 Exports of goods and services 0085008               .0047255 -1.80 0.073 
DEA bank cost efficiency -.0016974    .0185071     -0.09    0.927 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0396696    .0223542     -1.77    0.077 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0069824    .0242296         0.29 0.773 
Constant .3343515    .1581902      2.11    0.035 
 F( 41,   281) =   14.06 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.55       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 4     
Lag1 Exports of goods and services -.0088462    .0048804        -1.81 0.071 
DEA bank cost efficiency -.0020997        .0185456 -0.11    0.910 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0554089    .0332982     -1.66    0.097 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio .0030896     .025184      0.12    0.902 
Constant .2676152     2.08    0.039 
 F( 41,   281) =   13.81    
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.55       











Table H5 – Imports of goods and services 
 
 Estim. Coefiicient Standard Error t-statistic P-value 
Model 1     
Lag1 Imports of goods and services -.0098502    .0053353     -1.85    0.066 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0087401    .0201282      0.43    0.664 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0408689    .0203694     -2.01    0.046 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -.0047979    .4599935     -0.01    0.992 
Constant .3265767    .1441066      2.27    0.024 
 F( 41,   281) =   15.26 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.58       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 2     
Lag1 Imports of goods and services -.0102397        .0055195 -1.86    0.065 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0084843    .0206161      0.41    0.681 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0551813    .0298578     -1.85    0.066 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio -.0640436    .4722492     -0.14    0.892 
Constant .2502594    .1155164      2.17    0.031 
 F( 41,   281) =   15.13 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.58       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 3     
Lag1 Imports of goods and services -.01032     .005179     -1.99    0.047 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0096191     .020782      0.46    0.644 
Bank market concentration  (HHI) measure -.0410148    .0203074     -2.02    0.044 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -.0152038    .0315356     -0.48    0.630 
Constant .3294463    .1434333      2.30    0.022 
 F( 41,   281) =   15.29 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     = 0.58       
Number of obs =     323     
     
Model 4     
Lag1 Imports of goods and services -.0106366    .0053054     -2.00    0.046 
DEA bank cost efficiency .0096433    .0209428      0.46    0.646 
Bank market concentration  (C3) measure -.0557925    .0294442     -1.89    0.059 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio -.0190431    .0321867     -0.59    0.555 
Constant .2546847    .1137431      2.24    0.026 
F( 41,   281) =   15.15 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    
R-squared     =0.58       
Number of obs =     323     
 
 
(*) Growth i,t = α0 + α1 year dummiesi + α2  country dummiest + α3 lag1 growth i,t-1 + α4 bank efficiency i,t +  α5 bank market 
concentration i,t + α 6 control variables i,t                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
Where: 
 Growth = natural logarithm of the GDP (at market prices), or of one of its main components: final 
consumption, gross fixed capital formation, exports or imports 
 i = EU country (1 = 1, ... 27) 
 t = year (t = 1996, ..., 2008) 
 Lag1 growth = first lag (t-1) of the growth endogenous variable  
36 
 
 Bank efficiency = natural logarithm of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) bank cost efficiency  
 Bank market concentration = natural logarithm of the percentage share of the total assets held by the three 
largest banking institutions (C3)  or natural logarithm of the Helfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 Control variables = return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) 
 
(**) In all equations, year and the country dummies are included and their specific results are available on request. 
